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  This paper provides an understanding of how the export credit worthiness of an 
importing country affects export sales of agricultural and other manufactured products 
and how export credit guarantees or insurance can mitigate risks of non-payment.  A 
theoretical model is developed.  It shows how risk mitigation through export credit 
insurance could increase exports to high risk importing countries.  The key result is that 
the export response curve is more inelastic in the presence of payment risk, and the effect 
of insurance is to make the export curve more elastic.  Statistical evidence supports this 
fundamental premise. 
 










  2Introduction 
  Promoting and selling manufactured as well as agricultural goods and services in 
foreign markets incurs a risk of insolvency or delayed payment by the foreign buyers 
because only a few of them are willing or able to pay full cash in advance.  Posner (1997) 
classifies these risks into three types: commercial, political, and economical.   
Commercial risks include buyer insolvency, default on payment, repudiation of goods, or 
contract termination.  Political risks arise from foreign exchange conversion, transfer 
payment difficulties, insurrection, cancellation of import or export permits, and/or 
changes in policies or government regimes that place new restrictions on, or delay the 
execution of, exporting contracts.  Economic risks arise from the weaknesses of a 
country’s economic condition. 
  A common approach to mitigating risks associated with export sales is to 
indemnify the risks through credit guarantees or insurance from either private financial 
institutions or government programs.  In Canada, this can be accomplished by using 
various service packages offered by the Canadian Export Development Corporation.  The 
insurability of an export is determined by a number of macroeconomic conditions relating 
to the importing country.  These risks are represented through international credit scores.  
While credit scores are reasonably accurate in measuring intra-country risks and 
commonly used in deciding cross-country lending (Melvin, 2000), surprisingly, little is 
known about the relationship between actual credit scores and exports.  The theory and 
practice of credit scoring for export risk suggests that exports would be higher for credit 
worthy importing countries.  In addition to this gap in the academic literature, there does 
not seem to be a sound economic framework that ties the probability of default, as 
  3measured ordinally by the credit scores, and other attitudes of the export decision, 
including coverage levels and risk aversion.  Hence, this paper addresses both gaps in the 
literature by constructing a theoretical model and estimating an export response function 
for Canadian agricultural and other goods. 
  The problem we address is economically significant since goods will less likely 
be exported to countries with poor credit ratings due to high default rates.  Export credit 
insurance can be used to mitigate such risks, but the gross benefits from risk reduction 
may be offset by premium and administrative, or loading, costs that increase with higher 
rates of default risks.  Thus, subsidized credit insurance offered by governments could 
then lead to an incremental increase in exports over unsubsidized private insurance. 
  In the broader context of international trade theory, Abraham and Dewit (2000) 
and Leathers (2001) state that export promotion by governments is still controversial 
among academic economists, policy-makers, and business representatives.  Fitzgerald 
and Monson (1988), and the OECD (1998) state that the earlier practices of export credit 
programs of industrialized countries had been in the form of export subsidies.   
Theoretically, Caves and Jones (1981), Houck (1986), Kreinin (1991), and others show 
that under the traditional assumptions of international trade theory, including certainty in 
prices and payment, export credit in the form of export subsidies may not be in the best 
interest of the exporting country because subsidies are transferred, in part, to the 
importing country and because of a misallocation of resources in both exporting and 
importing countries due to skewed market signals.  In this context, a subsidy is 
considered to be an unfair and uneconomic trading practice.  Furthermore, export 
  4subsidies can deteriorate the terms of trade of countries that do not provide export 
subsidies. 
  On the other hand, risks and imperfect information are commonly present in 
foreign markets.  If certainty and full information are relaxed from the traditional 
assumptions of international trade theory, the general conclusion discussed above may 
not be so clear-cut.  Grinols (1985) concludes from an economic welfare perspective that 
the channels of welfare influence for an open country become more complicated when 
uncertainty and international trade in securities are considered.  Moreover, when the 
assumption of uncertainty is relaxed, the theory of international trade does not rule out a 
role for government intervention (Brainard and Cooper, 1968).  They show that wide 
variations in export receipts leading to fluctuations in national income are costly to 
primary producing countries in terms of social cohesion, efficient allocation of resources, 
and economic growth.  Additionally, they point out that there are several ways in which 
the social costs of fluctuations may differ from private costs.  This can lead to a 
diversified trade strategy for a private exporter that may not be optimal from a social 
point of view. 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of how the export credit 
worthiness of an importing country affects export sales of agricultural and other 
manufactured products and how export credit guarantees or insurance can mitigate risks 
of non-payment.  The paper makes a contribution to the specific literature on how export 
credit risks affect agricultural and other exports, and also contributes to the broader 
literature on international trade theory by showing that risk is indeed an economically 
significant factor in trade.  The paper is positioned relative to an exporter who has agreed 
  5to the terms of trade, including price, with an importer.  Since price becomes a 
contractual obligation, we do not examine price discovery per se.  Rather, we examine 
how, given a price, the probability of default affects exports.  We argue that the 
economics driving export credit guarantees or export credit insurance rests on the premise 
that the supply curve of an exporting firm becomes more inelastic as the risk of non-
payment increases.  In other words, the exporting firm is more likely to export to 
countries with low risk of non-payment than one with higher risk, all other things being 
equal.  It follows that the provision of export credit insurance or guarantees that are 
targeted towards risk reduction can increase exports by encouraging exports that would 
not otherwise be made to countries with high risk of non-payment. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a 
theoretical model that explains the impact on exports arising from the risk of default and 
general export credit insurance and relates the findings of this model with related 
research findings.  Section 3 empirically evaluates the key finding of the theoretical 
model using Canadian export data of agricultural goods and goods from all industries.  
To verify the results from the Canadian model, we also empirically examine additional 
export data from Canada, Australia, and United States.  Section 4 concludes the paper. 
A Theory on the Impact of Credit Guarantees and Insurance on Export Promotion 
  This section presents a theoretical model in which the exporting firm faces default 
risk on its exports but has the opportunity to indemnify itself against losses.  The purpose 
of this model is to investigate how an optimal level of exports is impacted by the risk of 
default and the presence of a general insurance scheme that provides protection at a fair 
or subsidized cost.  Suppose that the profit function of an exporting firm is, 
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Where ‘Q’ is the exporting quantity, ‘P’ is the negotiated contract price of the exporting 
good, ‘F(θ)’ is the cumulative probability distribution function of getting paid, and ‘θ’ is 
a credit score that explains non-payment on the export sales.  For simplicity one might 
view F(θ) as the predicted value from a logistic international credit scoring model with a 
value F(θ) = 1 representing full payment of the amount ‘QP’, and F(θ) = 0 representing 
non-payment.  The expected probability of being paid is denoted by  ) (θ F F = , and in 
practice, this would represent a prior probability.  Funatsu (1986), Dewit (1996), and 
Abraham and Dewit (2000) consider a similar problem structure.  The variable ‘Z’ is the 
coverage level from an insurance policy or export guarantee such that ‘1 ≥ Z ≥ 0.’  If the 
exporter receives less than ‘Z%’ of the contracted sales amount of (QP) then the exporter 
would receive an indemnifying amount of (ZQP – QP*) where P* is the actual average 
per unit price received by the exporter.  The prior probability of such indemnifying 
payment is (1 - F ).  The variable ‘r’ is a constant factor that reflects a constant marginal 
cost of exporting without accounting for risks of non-payment
1, and δ represents a 
loading factor that reflects the administrative cost of providing the insurance scheme.  
Note that a positive value for δ represents the loading cost to the exporter for purchasing 
private insurance, while a negative value for δ represents a subsidy as might be found 
with publicly provided insurance programs.  Finally, ‘w’ is the insurance premium rate 
per unit of the exporting good.  It is a function of the probability of payment (F ), prices 
(P), and a coverage level (Z) which the exporter desires to insure on his export sales, that 
is w = w(F , P, Z).  By definition ∂w/∂P and ∂w/∂Z are positive, and ∂w/∂F  is negative. 
  7  Equation (1) assumes that the risk of not getting paid, (1 – F(θ)), is directly 
attached to the export price.  Thus, the price of getting paid (PF(θ)) is assumed to be a 
random variable with mean and variance defined as 
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The expected value and variance of the profit function can then be written as equations 
(4) and (5) respectively. 
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  Assuming that the exporting firm maximizes the expected utility of profit, the 
problem can be written as 
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where λ is a constant factor that measures the risk attitude of the exporter.  The higher the 
value of λ, the more risk averse the exporter will be.  The first order condition of the 
maximization problem with respect to ‘Q’ is, 
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Solving equation (7) in terms of Q*, as the optimal exporting quantity
2, gives 
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In contrast, the optimal exporting quantity in the absence of an insurance scheme (Z = 0), 
is 
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  The relationship between the exporting quantity and the coverage level can be 
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If the exporting quantity (Q*) is positive, the second term on the right side of equation 
(10) is positive.  Note that the partial derivative of ‘w’ with respect to Z is positive 
because as the coverage level increases it causes the insurance premium rate to increase.  
However, it is also reasonable to assume that P(1 - F )  ≥  δ(∂w/∂Z); since in the 
alternative the exporter may not consider it worthwhile to pay for a particular level of 
coverage if the marginal cost of buying the coverage level is greater than its expected 
benefit.  As a result, the right hand side of equation (10) is positive, and this implies that 
an exporter can increase exports in the presence of an insurance program. 
  Together with the change of coverage level, we can see the impact of a subsidized 












































Clearly, it is negative.  This implies that if a large portion of the premium is subsidized, 
exports will increase.  This result is consistent with the findings of Funatsu (1986).   
However, the result also implies that an unsubsidized insurance premium with a positive 
  9loading factor, δ > 1, will decrease exports.  In fact, there is a possibility that excessive 
loading costs can reduce or eliminate any economic benefit from increased coverage.  
Nonetheless, the result is also consistent with the conclusions of Abraham and Dewit 
(2000) in which even at unsubsidized levels, an insurer can reduce risk enough to provide 
some benefit to exporters.  That is, as δ increases, ∂Q*/∂Z approaches zero, diminishing 
the spread between Q* and Q0.  In other words, a sufficiently high value of δ would 
encourage self-insurance at the export level of Q0.  As pointed out by Rude (2000), if 
trade distortion due to the subsidy of insurance credits is an issue, it is important to 
determine the implicit subsidy values as well as the face value of the export credit 
arrangement in order to assess whether such an arrangement has a distorting effect on 
trade flows. 
  Another view of the effect of the loading factor on the exporting quantity can be 
obtained by taking the partial derivative of equation (8) directly with respect to δ, holding 










θ σ λ δ Z
w Q
 
As the loading factor (such as administrative costs) increases, it reduces the net benefit of 
the policy and therefore reduces optimal export quantities.  However, if the loading factor 
is negative, due to (for example) government subsidies, equation (12) indicates that the 
exporter will likely increase the exporting quantity.  This is the precise economic 
response to a publicly provided insurance program that leads critics to believe that 
subsidies lead to unfair trade practices (Fitzgerald and Monson (1988), Rude (2000), and 
Leathers (2001)). 
  10  The relationship between the optimal exporting quantity and the attitude of the 
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This implies that as the risk aversion of the exporter increases optimal exports decrease, 
even in the presence of an export insurance policy.  Since ∂
2Q*/∂λ∂Z < 0, the negative 
impact of risk aversion can be offset with increased coverage levels or, because 
∂
2Q*/∂λ∂δ > 0, increased subsidization.  However, if risk aversion is a result of 
informational asymmetries between the exporter and the importer, or ambiguity about the 
political economy of the importing country, it may be possible for a government to 
reduce risk aversion by increasing the flow of credible information to the exporter.  This 
could cause a decrease in λ and consequently would increase Q*. 
  In a finding consistent with Funatsu (1986), as the variance ( ) increases, 
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This result is consistent with the theoretical conclusions of Ruffin (1974), Anderson and 
Riley (1976), and Eaton (1979).  Increased levels of coverage or subsidization can offset 
the variance effect because it lowers the probability of loss.  The probability of loss is an 
explicit argument in the definition of variance found in equation (3). 
  11  The relationship between the optimal exporting quantity and the prior probability 
of getting paid can be obtained by taking the partial derivative of equation (8) with 
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The second term on the right hand side is positive under the reasonable assumption that 
∂σθ/∂F  is non-positive.  That is, as the prior probability of getting paid increases it is 
most likely that the variance about the prior probability of getting paid will either 
decrease or at least not change.  Equation (15) implies that as the prior probability, or 
certainty, of getting paid increases exports will rise.  The converse is economically 
significance, since it suggests that uncertainty unto itself is sufficient to negatively impact 
export quantity.  For example, if an exporter must choose between a developed economy 
with good credit worthiness versus a lesser developed economy with poor credit 
worthiness, the tendency would be to export to the safer market.  This suggests a role for 
credit insurance in export markets.  In fact, even in the absence of credit insurance it is 
simple to show from equation (9) that ∂Q0/∂F  > 0. 
  In the presence of credit insurance, it is clear that the difference of the partial 
derivatives of equations (8) and (9) with respect to F  is positive: 
. 0
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  12This implies that as the prior probability of getting paid increases, the exporter increases 
its level of exports more under the presence of export insurance scheme rather than in the 
absence of an export insurance scheme. 
Empirical Evidence of the Relationship Between Exports and Credit Worthiness 
  The theoretical model developed in the previous section rested on the premise that 
there is indeed a positive relationship between credit worthiness as measured by the 
credit score of an importing country and the exports to that country.  We take as the null 
hypothesis that no such relationship exists, but if this hypothesis is rejected then we can 
accept the assertion that follows from it.  For example, if there is no relationship between 
exports and credit risk, then the conditions for a credit insurance market are not satisfied.  
In the absence of a credit insurance market, issues surrounding credit subsidies and the 
economic consequences of subsidies are moot. 
  From the theoretical model, we assert that a positive relationship between credit 
worthiness and exports does exist.  Especially, equation (15) shows that, as the prior 
probability of getting paid increases, the amount of exports will rise.  In addition, the 
model suggests that because of credit risks the amount of exports to countries with high-
risk of defaulting will be lowered.  As a result, such credit insurance would encourage 
exporters to increase their exports to countries with high-risk of defaulting. 
  In this section, we attempt to provide evidence that supports the main assertions.  
We expect that the export value per capita of an importing country is an increasing 
function of the credit score that is tagged to that importing country.  We use export values 
per capita of importing countries, rather than total export values, to normalize the data 
  13across importing countries.  Additionally, we use intra-country credit ratings as 
calculated by the Euromoney magazine
3. 
  Relying simply on the relationship between exports and credit scores may at first 
glance seem to omit several relevant explanatory variables.  However, according to 
Haque et al (1997), Euromoney magazine derives the credit scores based on three main 
indicators: analytical, credit, and market indicators.  It assesses 40% weight to analytical 
indicators.  These indicators include political risk, economic risk, and economic 
indicators.  The economic indicators include debt service/exports, external debt/GNP, and 
balance of payments/GNP.  It assesses 20% weight to credit indicators that include 
historical payment records and any previous rescheduling of debts.  The remaining 40% 
weight is assessed to market indicators that include an access to bond markets, a sell-
down on short-term paper, and an access to discounts available from forfeiting houses.  
Therefore, a country that has a credit score close to 100 percent is considered to be 
creditworthy. 
  To include additional explanatory variables raises the possibility of 
multicollinearity.  For example, if the GNP per capita of the importing countries were to 
be included as an additional explanatory variable, the result would be collinear because 
the GNP of an importing country is included as a component of the credit score tagged to 
that country
4. 
  For our analysis, we obtained intra-country credit ratings from the Euromoney 
magazine issued in 1998.  Thus, we take the credit scores of the importing countries as 
given and focus on examining the relationship between the international credit scores and 
export values per capita of the importing countries. 
  14  Data on export values per capita were obtained from three different sources.  Data 
for 1998 Canadian export values for all industries and for agricultural and related service 
industries were obtained from Statistic Canada’s ‘Trade Data Online’
5.  This data set is 
comprised of over 175 different countries matched to their credit scores.  To confirm the 
generality of the result, we also obtained trade data for Canada, United States, and 
Australia from the International Trade Statistics Yearbook published by the World Bank.  
We use this data on general exports, F.O.B., in US dollars, to identify a group of 22 
importing countries that all three countries exported to.  Lastly, data of 1998 population 
and GNP per capita in US dollars of the importing countries were obtained from ‘the 
2000 World Development Indicators’. 
  Since not all of these countries imported Canadian goods in a consistent pattern 
and without knowing the real causes of missing data, countries that did not import 
Canadian goods or had no record of its GNP per capita in 1998 were excluded from the 
analysis.  Table 1 provides a summary of the two types of Canadian exports.  There are a 
total of 156 and 118 countries importing ‘goods from all industries’ and ‘agricultural and 
related service industries’ respectively from Canada. 
  Table 2 summarizes Canadian, American, and Australian export values for 22 
common importing countries.  The difference between the two data sets is evident by 
comparing the figure for Canada.  In Table 2, the mean GNP per capita of importing 
countries is $14,247 whereas the counter part from the data set for Canadian exports from 
all industries is $5,735.  Clearly, the data set of Canadian exports from all industries is 
larger and includes more of the less developed countries.  Consequently, the mean credit 
  15score for this data set at 37.91 is much lower than 68.09 found for the 22 more 
prosperous countries in Table 2. 
  Table 3 illustrates the relationship between the key variables used in our analysis
6.  
It consists of the export values per capita of the importing countries from Canada, United 
States, and Australia as well as the GNP per capita of those importing countries.  Column 
2 provides the rank of credit worthiness of the importing countries with ‘1’ being the 
most credit worthy and ‘22’ the least.  The third column provides credit scores from 
Euromoney out of 100.  It ranges from a high of 97.06 for Germany to a low of 27.20 for 
Indonesia. 
  To support our assertion that exports are an increasing function of the credit 
worthiness of importing countries, we estimate across the importing countries the 
following regression: 
. ) 17 ( e bX a Y + + =  
In equation (17), Y is the log of export value per capita of a designated importing 
country, X is the log of the credit score tagged to that importing country, and ‘e’ is an 
error term.  To incorporate the difference of income effects on the export values among 
importing countries, we segregated the data into four income categories by adding three 
dummy variables into equation (17) as: 
. ) 18 ( 3 2 1
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In equation (18), D1 represents the dummy variable for a low-income country by taking 
on the value of ‘1’ if the 1998 GNP per capita of that importing country is less than $765 
US and zero otherwise
6.  D2 represents the dummy variable for a low-middle income 
country in which GNP per capita is greater than $765 but less than $3035 US, and D3 
  16represents the dummy variable for an upper-middle income country with GNP per capita 
greater than $3035 but less than $9385 US.  In this model, the intercept term (a*) 
represents a high-income country in which its GNP per capita is greater than $9385 US. 
  Table 4 presents the results of the regressions of equations (17) and (18) with 
respect to Canadian ‘agricultural goods’ and ‘goods from all industries’ using the statistic 
Canada data.  From Table 4, the results clearly reject the null hypothesis, H0: b = 0, at the 
5% level of significance for both types of Canadian exports.  However, when the dummy 
variables were included, H0 is rejected only for the Canadian goods from all industries.
  Individually, the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables representing the 
upper-middle and high-income countries are not significantly different from zero at the 
10% level for both types of Canadian exports.  However, the estimated coefficients of the 
dummy variable representing the low-middle income countries is significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level for Canadian goods from all industries, and only significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level for Canadian agricultural goods.  Clearly, the 
estimated coefficients of the dummy variables representing the low-income countries are 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level for both types of Canadian exports.  A 
Chow test, using equation (17) as a restricted model, indicates that collectively the 
dummy variables are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
  The results lead to several important conclusions.  First, the relationship between 
credit worthiness and the two types of Canadian export values is unambiguously positive.  
Second, the magnitude of relationship between credit worthiness and export values is 
different for the two types of Canadian exports.  From Table 4, based on the regression of 
equation (17), a 1% increase in the credit score of an importing country suggests an 
  17increase of 1.43% in the value of Canadian agricultural goods exporting to that country, 
but 2.18% for the value of Canadian goods from all industries. 
  Third, when the importing countries are categorized into different income classes, 
it is evident that the export relationship is characterized by two different export response 
functions.  Given, the insignificance of the dummy variables representing the upper- and 
high-income countries, the results suggest that these two classes are all treated the same 
in terms of the relationship between the credit score and exports.  In contrast, the 
significant and negative values associated with the estimated coefficients of the dummy 
variables representing the low-income and low-middle income countries suggest that 
there exists an additional and negative bias toward them. 
  Fourth, not only do the results suggest a direct relationship between credit 
worthiness and exports, but also it follows automatically that repayment risk is an 
important determinant of exports.  From a policy perspective, credit insurance or credit 
guarantees, at a fair or subsidized price, can help exporters mitigate risks of exporting to 
low-income countries.  As such, risks are reduced, credit worthiness improved, and an 
increase in exports will be realized.  This improvement will be highest for low-income 
and less developed countries.  As concluded from the theoretical model, factors such as 
high guarantees, reduced loadings or subsidies, and lower possibilities of default, are all 
factors that would increase the credit worthiness of an importing country, and hence lead 
to improved exports. 
A Cross-Country Comparison 
  In this section we use the data set from the International Trade Statistics 
Yearbook to see whether the results found for the larger Canadian data set are general.  
  18Equations (17) and (18) were estimated for the inter-country comparisons between 
Canada, United States, and Australia using the data reported in Table 3, and the results 
are presented in Table 5.  The results of the regression (17) clearly reject the null 
hypothesis, H0: b = 0, at the 5% level of significance for all Canadian, American, and 
Australian export values.  However, when the dummy variables were included, H0 cannot 
be rejected for all Canadian, American, and Australian export values.  The joint test of all 
estimated coefficients being zero against the alternative of at least one estimated 
coefficient not being zero is rejected at the 5% level of significance for all Canadian, 
American, and Australian export values. 
  Individually, the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables representing the 
high-, upper-, low-middle-, and lower-income countries are not significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level for the Australian export values.  However, only the estimated 
coefficients of the dummy variables representing the high-, upper-, and low-middle-
income countries are not significantly different from zero at the 10% level for both the 
Canadian and American export values.  The estimated coefficients of the dummy 
variables representing the lower-income countries are significantly different from zero at 
the 10% and 5% levels for Canadian and American export values, respectively. 
  To determine whether the dummy variables in the Canadian and Australian 
models contributed any explanatory power to equation (18), we again employed a Chow 
F-test using equation (17) as the restricted regression.  The Chow test cannot be rejected 
at the 10% levels of significance for Australia but can be rejected at the 10% level of 
significance for Canada
7. 
  19  The results from the cross-country comparison are somewhat, but not totally, 
consistent with the larger Canadian-based model.  One strong conclusion is that all 
countries display a significant relationship between the credit score and exports.   
Regarding the 22 common importing countries, neither Canada or Australia differentiate 
export response based on the income levels of the importing countries, but the evidence 
does suggest that United States does distinguish low-income countries from other income 
classes.  The reason for the discrepancies between the larger Canadian-based model 
results and cross-country comparison is (as implied by endnote 7) probably due to the 
fact that the larger data set as described in Table 1 includes a larger number of low 
income countries, with a lower income base, than the 22 common countries represented 
by Tables 2 and 3. 
VI. Concluding Comments 
  This paper examined how export credit risks impact export sales, and how export 
credit guarantees or insurance mitigate the risks of non-payment on export sales, 
including agricultural products as well as products from all industries.  We presented a 
theoretical model that showed how risk mitigation through export credit insurance could 
increase export supply.  The theoretical model suggests that exports will increase with a 
decrease in the probability of default, an increase in the coverage or guarantee, a 
decreased or subsidized premium rate, lower risk aversion, and lower variance of 
amounts getting paid.  Subsidies will increase exports, but pressures under the 
Arrangement
8 and WTO legislation may cause the removal of all export subsidies, even 
for agricultural products.  To induce exports, the results suggest that reducing 
  20informational asymmetries or risk perceptions may be a non-pecuniary approach to 
encouraging export sales. 
  Finally, using export values per capita of the importing countries, data for 
Canadian agricultural goods and goods from all industries and for Canada, Australia and 
the U.S. and international credit scores we showed, empirically, that there is indeed a 
relationship between exports and credit worthiness.  The theoretical model, and the 
empirical results provide a strong justification for the use of export credit insurance and 
guarantees to increase optimal export quantities.  The results suggest that governments 
can ‘encourage’ exports to less developed countries by subsidizing insurance premiums 
to exporters, and/or providing other low cost intelligence services.  The results suggest 
that the exporter’s supply curve is more inelastic in the presence of uncertainty, than it 
would be in the case of certainty.  Moreover, the results suggest that the supply curve will 
become more elastic, offering a larger quantity for a given price, in the presence of export 
credit guarantees or insurance.  Since the exporter’s supply curve facing low-income 
countries such as less developed countries is the most inelastic, it appears that programs 








  21Endnotes: 
1.  We have assumed for simplicity that at the negotiated price (P) the exporting firm 
faces a constant average or marginal cost, in the neighbourhood of that negotiated price.  
This assumption is also made by Abraham and Dewit (2000).  Regarding to the second 
order condition, see note 2.  However, suppose, as in Dewitt (1996), that the marginal 
cost is increasing and described by ‘rQ
2’ rather than ‘rQ’ then upon substitution into the 
maximisation problem, ‘ ’ and ‘∂ ’.  This suggests that an 
increase in ‘r’ will lead to a greater expected profit if the new price is able to be 
renegotiated to equal its marginal cost at a new solution, since the percentage increase in 
price will exceed the percentage increase in quantity. 
0 /
* < ∂ ∂ r Q 0 /
2 * 2 > ∂r Q
 
2.  The second order condition of the maximization problem is, 
, 0 ) 1 (
2 2 < − − θ σ λ Z  
which is held true without assuming the marginal cost is an increasing function of the 
export quantity (Q). 
 
3.  Another source of country risk ratings is the Institutional Investor in which has 
compiled a country risk rating since 1979. 
 
4.  We have run two types of regressions to determine the relationship between the credit 
score and the GNP per capita of importing countries and to determine the existence of 
multicollinearity.  The results showed that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the credit score and the GNP per capita of the importing countries.  Also, the 
results showed symptoms of multicollinearity when the GNP per capita was included 
together with the credit score as explanatory variables of the export values per capita of 
the importing countries.  The inclusion of GNP per capita helps improving the values of 
R
2 but makes the estimated coefficients smaller and not significantly different from zero. 
 
5.  www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/ 
 
6.  The categorization of these importing countries is followed from the report of the IMF 
in which the Development Assistance Committee of the OEDC categorized developing 
countries in deciding financial aids. 
 
7.  Similar procedure of the cross-country analysis was also performed for the available 
data in which the three countries export to.  There were 35, 37, and 38 countries that 
Australia, Canada, and United States export to, respectively.  The significant results 
indicate that the estimated coefficients of the dummy variable representing the low-
income countries are significantly different from zero at 5% level for both Canadian and 
American export values and is significantly different from zero at the 10% level for 
Australian export values.  This also indicates that these three exporting countries have a 
negative bias against the low-income countries. 
 
8.  It is also known as the “Gentleman’s Agreement” in which twenty-two participants 
that represent member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
  22Development (OECD) negotiate a set of rules regarding to the use of export credit 























  23References: 
 
Abraham, F., (1990).  The Effects on Intra-Community Competition of Export 
Subsidies to Third Countries: The Case of Export Credits, Export Insurance and 
Official Development Assistance.  (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities). 
 
Abraham, F. and G. Dewit, (2000).  ‘Export Promotion Via Official Export Insurance.’  
Open Economies Review, Vol. 11, 5-26. 
 
Anderson, J.E. and J.G. Riley, (1976).  ‘International Trade with Fluctuating Prices.’  
International Economic Review, Vol. 17(1), 76-97. 
 
Brainard, W.C. and R.N. Cooper, (1968).  ‘Uncertainty and Diversification in 
International Trade.’  Studies in Agricultural Economics Trade and Development, 
Vol. 8, 257-285. 
 
Caves, R. and R. Jones, (1981).  World Trade and Payments: An Introduction.  (Third 
Edition) (Boston: Little Brown Ltd.). 
 
Dewit, G., (1996).  ‘Export Insurance Subsidisattion: Risk Coverage, Strategic Export 
Promotion or Aid?’  Discussion Papers 9614, University of Glasgow. 
 
Eaton, J., (1979).  ‘The Allocation Resources in an Open Economy with Uncertain Terms 
of Trade.’  International Economic Review, Vol. 20(1), 391-403. 
 
Euromoney (1998).  ‘How the Mighty are Falling’, September. 
 
Fitzgerald, B. and T. Monson (1988).  ‘Export Credit and Insurance for Export 
Promotion.’  Finance and Development, Vol. 25 (4), 53-55. 
 
Funatsu, H., (1986).  ‘Export Credit Insurance.’  Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 
53(4), 679-692. 
 
Grinols, E.L., (1985).  ‘Trade, Distortions, and Welfare under Uncertainty.’  Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol. 37, 362-374. 
 
Haque, N.U., D. Mathieson, and N. Mark, (1997). ‘Rating the Raters of Country 
Creditworthiness.’  Finance and Development, Vol. (March), 10-13. 
 
Houck, J.P. (1986).  Elements of Agriculture Trade Policies. (Illinois:  Waveland Press 
Inc.). 
 
International Monetary Fund (1998).  ‘Official Financing for Developing Countries.’ 
World Economic and Financial Surveys: (Washington, DC: International Monetary 
Fund). 
  24Kreinin, M. E. (1991).  International Economics: A Policy Approach. (Sixth Edition) 
(Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.). 
 
Leathers, H. D., (2001).  ‘Agricultural Export Subsidies as a Tool of Trade Strategy: 
Before and after the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996.’   
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 83(1), 209-221. 
 
Melvin, M., (2000). International Money and Finance (sixth edition) (New York: 
Addison Wesley Longman Inc.). 
 
OECD (1998).  The export Credit Arrangement: Achievements and Challenges 
1978-1998. (Paris: OECD). 
 
Posner, M., (1997).  Export Credit.  In Barry, M.A. (ed) Credit Management: The Key 
to Profitable Trading.  (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons). 
 
Rude, J., (2000).  ‘Reform of Agricultural Export Credit Programs.’  The Estey Centre 
Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Vol. 1(1), 2000, 66-82. 
 
Ruffin, R.J., (1974).  ‘International Trade under Uncertainty.’  Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 4, 243-259. 
 
United Nations (1999).  1998 International Trade Statistics Yearbook Vol. 1. 
(New York: United Nations). 
 



























Table 1: A Summary of Canadian Agricultural and All Goods Exporting to Various 
Importing Countries 
  Agricultural Goods  All Goods 
Number of Observations  118  156 
Mean of Credit Score (CS)  43.68  37.91 
Highest of CS  98.90  98.90 
Lowest of CS  4.94  4.94 
Standard Deviation of CS  28.47  27.56 
Mean of Export Values
* (EV)  1.77  17.88 
Standard Deviation of EV  3.13  60.16 
Mean of GNP
*   6999.7  5735.00 
Standard Deviation of GNP  10054.0  9233.8 









Table 2: A Summary of Cross Exporting Country Comparison the Relationship 
Between Credit Scores and Export Values Per Capita of Common Importing Countries 
 Canada  U.S.A.  Australia 
Number of Observations  22  22  22 
Mean of Credit Score (CS)  68.09  68.09  68.09 
Highest of CS  97.06  97.06  97.06 
Lowest of CS  27.20  27.20  27.20 
Standard Deviation of CS  26.34  26.34  26.34 
Mean of Export Values
* (EV)  31.70  460.38  47.07 
Standard Deviation of EV  39.45  518.53  75.53 
Mean of GNP
*  14247.00 14247.00 14247.00 
Standard Deviation of GNP  12324.00  12324.00  12324.00 



















Table 3: Representative Values of Canadian, American and Australian Export Values Per Capita 
of Common Importing Countries  
Common Importing Countries   Rank Score CAN98 USA98  AUS98 GNP98 
Germany 1 97.06 21.81 324.61 10.51 26570
Netherlands 2 96.92 79.31 1210.58 36.98 24780
Switzerland 3 96.43 87.63 1020.80 93.61 39980
France (includes Monaco and Andorra)  4 95.87 19.18 307.09 9.88 24210
United Kingdom (U.K.)  5 95.01 49.72 661.56 50.27 21410
Belgium 6 94.25 107.32 1423.19 74.56 25380
Sweden   7 93.39 27.83 431.48 11.74 25580
Spain   8 92.01 9.60 138.80 8.72 14100
Italy (includes Vatican City State) 9 91.10 17.85 156.92 18.75 20090
Japan    10 88.02 44.10 457.91 86.42 32350
Hong Kong  11 75.75 140.97 1932.42 332.55 23660
Korea, South (Dem. Rep.) 12 64.47 51.59 713.75 165.48 8600
Saudi Arabia   13 63.68 10.22 507.50 28.54 6910
China (including Mongolia)  14 47.97 1.165 11.51 1.92 750
South Africa   15 42.03 5.27 89.91 16.31 3310
Malaysia   16 41.89 12.87 403.65 51.79 3670
Thailand   17 41.15 3.16 85.51 13.15 2160
Philippines   18 40.35 1.67 89.61 9.18 1050
India   19 39.01 0.24 3.62 1.38 440
Turkey 20 38.50 2.39 55.36 5.52 3160
Brazil   21 35.94 1.77 91.38 1.58 4630






























































































    0.5621 
Note that the numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors of the corresponding estimated 
coefficients. 
S is referred to being significant different from zero at 10% level of significance. 
S* is referred to being significant different from zero at 5% level of significance. 
Note that individual test of being zero was performed for each estimated coefficient based on 



















Table 5: A Summary of Cross Exporting Country Comparison of the Relationship Between 
Credit Scores and Export Values Per Capita of Common Importing Countries 
Dependent 
Variable 
























































































   0.2665 
Note that the numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors of the corresponding estimated 
coefficients. 
S is referred to being significant different from zero at 10% level of significance. 
S* is referred to being significant different from zero at 5% level of significance. 
Note that individual test of being zero was performed for each estimated coefficient based on 
the two rails t-test. 
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